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Abstract 
Excessive free cash flows can lead to high agency problems as retaining free cash flow reduces the ability of 
capital market to monitor managers. Managers are also likely to waste the free cash flow on value-decreasing 
investments. Based on the free cash flow hypothesis, this study examines the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance of a sample of high agency costs of free cash flow firms, which is defined as 
firms that have high free cash flow and low investment opportunities. The sample firms are extracted from firms 
listed on the S&P/TSX composite index between 2009 and 2012. Using corporate governance scores provided 
by The Globe and Mail, this study finds that better corporate governance is associated with better firm 
performance, measured by return on equity. The results highlight the importance of corporate governance in 
protecting shareholders’ interests. 
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Introduction  
The free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) suggests that managers are likely to invest in projects that 
are not in the best interests of the shareholders when they have more cash than is needed to fund all positive 
net present value (NPV) investments. Agency theorists argue that excessive free cash flow can intensify the 
agency problem between managers and shareholders. This is because free cash flow can be used by managers 
as a tool to promote their self-interests. 
The importance of corporate governance is recognized aftermath of major corporate scandals and financial 
crises. Regulators all over the world tighten regulations. Many empirical studies have been conducted over the 
last two decades to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in the 
world. However, no consistent results were found (Pande, 2012). This study therefore contributes to the 
literature by providing more concrete evidence on the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance by focusing on a sample of firms that are considered to suffer from high agency problems. Based 
on Jensen’s (1986) FCF hypothesis, this study defines firms with high agency costs of FCF as having high free 
cash flow and low investment opportunities.  
Since corporate governance can reduce the agency problems between managers and shareholders, the aim of 
this study is to examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance for high agency 
costs of FCF firms. Specifically, we test if high agency costs of FCF firms with poorer corporate governance are 
associated with lower firm performance. Knowing how corporate governance affects firm performance is 
important to regulators and directors. The result of this study is also of interest to investors at large by 
showing whether sufficient governance mechanisms are in place to monitor managers and protect their 
interests. 
This study finds support for the traditional agency theory and good corporate governance. Based on a sample 
of high agency costs of FCF firms listed on the S&P/TSX composite index between 2009 and 2012, this study 
finds that firms with better corporate governance (measured by corporate governance scores provided by The 
Globe and Mail ) have higher firm performance (measured by return on equity). Improved governance 
structures can enhance the long-term prosperity of companies.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section reviews prior literature on corporate governance and 
firm performance, and develops the hypothesis tested in this study. Then, descriptions of the sample, data, and 
model specifications are provided. Finally, empirical results and conclusions are presented in the last section of 
the study. 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Agency problems occur due to a separation of ownership and control. Because of incomplete contractual 
relationship, managers may not act in the best interests of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
free cash flow hypothesis based on the agency theory was proposed by Jensen in 1986. Jensen (1986) argues 
that when managers have more cash than is needed to fund all profitable projects, they are likely to waste the 
free cash on value-decreasing investments. The hypothesis suggests that excessive free cash flow will lower 
firm value and result in higher agency costs to shareholders. Brush et al. (2000) suggest three conditions for 
agency problems to occur. First, managers have strong motivations to satisfy their self-interests and maximize 
their own wealth. Secondly, excessive free cash flow could lead to managerial waste and inefficiency. Thirdly, 
weak corporate governance increases agency costs to shareholders.  
Corporate governance is crucial in building investors’ trust and attracting investors to the marketplace (Buallay 
et al., 2017). The impact of corporate governance on firm performance is therefore of great importance to 
shareholders. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find that better governance is associated with better 
contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance. However, no significant relationship is found 
between corporate governance and future stock market performance. Sueyoshi, Goto and Omi (2010) 
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investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance of Japanese manufacturing 
industries and find that stable shareholding is associated with higher operational performance only when the 
holdings by stable shareholders are more than 61.21%. Guo and Kga (2012) study Sri Lankan companies and 
find that director shareholdings have a significant effect on firm performance while the proportion of 
non-executive directors is negatively related to firm performance. Siddiqui (2015) examines the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance by conducting a meta-analysis of 25 previous studies. 
Siddiqui (2015) finds that external governance mechanisms (measured by anti-takeover provisions) and firm’s 
market performance (measured by Tobin’s Q and market to book value) are key moderators of this 
relationship.  
However, the results of studies on corporate governance and firm performance are mixed in nature. Fallatah 
and Dickins (2012) find that corporate governance and firm performance of Saudi-listed companies are 
unrelated. Gupta and Sharma (2014) report limited impact of corporate governance on firms’ share prices and 
performance. Arora and Sharma (2016) study a sample of Indian manufacturing firms and find that larger 
boards are associated with better firm performance while CEO duality is not related to firm performance. 
Buallay et al. (2017) study the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance for firms 
listed in Saudi stock exchange and find insignificant results on the relationship between corporate governance 
adoption and firm's operational and financial performance. No significant impacts are also found for largest 
shareholder’s ownership and board independence on firm's market performance.  
Given the preceding mixed results reviewed, this study adopts a sample that suffers severe agency problems 
(that is, firms with high agency costs of free cash flow) and aims to provide more concrete evidence on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Based on the traditional agency theory, this 
study hypothesizes that corporate governance can lower the free cash flow problem and is positively related 
to firm performance. That is, the following hypothesis is tested: 
H1: High agency costs of FCF firms with lower corporate governance scores have poorer firm performance. 
Data and Method 
Sample and Data 
This study investigates a sample of firms with high agency costs of FCF. The sample firms are extracted from 
firms listed on the S&P/TSX composite index for the period 2009-2012. Excluding firms that do not have all the 
required financial and accounting data for the entire period, the initial sample consists of 452 firm-year 
observations. Based Jensen’s (1986) FCF hypothesis, firms that have high free cash flow (defined as above the 
median free cash flow of firms listed on the S&P/TSX composite index) and low investment opportunities 
(defined as below the median Tobin’s Q of firms listed on the S&P/TSX composite index) are defined as having 
high agency costs of FCF. The final sample consists of 133 firm-year observations. 
In terms of data sources, the corporate governance scores used in this study are obtained from The Globe and 
Mail (G&M). The corporate governance scores are based on assessments on four elements: board compositions, 
shareholding and compensation, shareholder rights, and disclosure. The reason for choosing this sample 
period, 2009-2012, is that there were several modifications to composites of the index in 2009 and 2013. 
Therefore, to ensure consistency in corporate governance measurements, the sample period is limited to 
between 2009 and 2012. The financial and accounting data used in this study are obtained from the Standard 
& Poor’s Compustat database.  
Empirical Model 
To examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance of high agency costs of FCF 
firms, the following model is tested using a least square regression:  
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𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (1) 
The dependent variable of Model 1 is firm performance. Following previous research (including Danoshana 
and Ravivathani (2013); Roudaki and Bhuiyan (2015)), firm performance is measured by return on equity (ROE). 
The main variable of interest is corporate governance score (CG). The free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) 
suggests that firms with excessive free cash are likely to make value-decreasing investments and have greater 
agency problems. Strong corporate governance encourages investors’ confidence by helping align managers’ 
and shareholders’ interests and reducing the agency costs of free cash flow problem. Therefore, better 
corporate governance is expected to be associated with better firm performance. 
Four control variables, including firm size, leverage, retained earnings and industry, that have been suggested 
by previous studies (Kandukuri et al., 2015, Buallay et al., 2017, Palaniappan, 2017) as having an influence on 
firm performance, are included in the model. Table 1 provides the definitions of all relevant dependent, 
independent and control variables used in the analyses. 
Table 1 Variable descriptions 
Variable Symbol Description 
Dependent variable   
Firm performance ROE Ratio of net income to shareholder equity. 
Independent variable   
Corporate governance  CG Corporate governance score is collected from The Globe and 
Mail. 
Control variable   
Firm size FSIZE Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Leverage LEVERAGE Ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Retained earnings RETAIN Ratio of retained earnings to total equity. 
Industry dummy INDUSTRY Dummy variable that equals one if the firm belongs to the 
industrial sectors, including agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
mining, construction and manufacturing sectors, or 0 
otherwise. 
 
Results 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample data (that is, high agency costs of FCF firms) and the 
initial sample of all firms listed on the S&P/TSX composite index (excluding firms with missing financial and 
accounting data). For the high agency costs of FCF firms, the median ROE is 10.24% and the median corporate 
governance score is 65, which is slightly lower than the median corporate governance score of the initial 
sample, 69. The maximum and minimum corporate governance scores of high agency costs of FCF firms are 96 
and 39, respectively. The median LEVERAGE of high agency costs of FCF firms is 16.06%, which is lower than 
the median LEVERAGE of the initial sample, 18.18%. This is probably because high agency costs of FCF firms 
have high levels of free cash flow and therefore have less need to borrow money. The median RETAIN of high 
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agency costs of FCF firms is 61.67%, which is much higher than the median RETAIN of all firms listed on the 
S&P/TSX composite index, 53.52%. The finding suggests that high agency costs of FCF firms like to retain their 
earnings and therefore result in high levels of free cash flow. The mean FCF of high agency costs of FCF firms is 
4.57%, which is much higher than the mean FCF of the initial sample firms, 1.96%. 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix. It shows that ROE is significantly positively associated with FSIZE and 
RETAIN while negatively related to LEVERAGE. The correlation results suggest that larger firms are associated 
with better firm performance. Firms with higher retained earnings are associated with better firm performance 
while firms with higher debts have worse performance.  
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
 High agency costs of FCF firms 
(133 firm-year observations) 
 Firms listed on S&P/TSX composite index 
(452 firm-year observations) 
 Mean Median Max Min SD  Mean Median Max Min SD 
ROE (%) 6.84 10.24 62.24 -250.29 25.56  10.15 10.39 278.08 -250.29 21.46 
CG 67.26 65.00 96.00 39.00 16.02  68.13 69.00 97.00 27.00 16.03 
FSIZE (ln) 9.71 9.45 13.61 6.96 1.85  9.00 8.80 13.62 5.65 1.71 
LEVERAGE (%) 17.26 16.06 60.49 0.00 13.44  19.80 18.18 60.49 0.00 14.45 
RETAIN (%) 42.58 61.67 94.45 -438.62 74.00  35.82 53.52 94.45 -438.62 60.31 
FCF (%) 4.57  3.84  25.32  0.42  3.24   1.96 2.07 34.04 -54.72 9.60 
ROE is the ratio of net income to shareholder equity. CG is the corporate governance score collected from The 
Globe and Mail. FSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
RETAIN is the ratio of retained earnings to total equity. FCF is the ratio of free cash flow to book value of assets. 
Table 3 Correlation analysis 
 ROE CG FSIZE LEVERAGE RETAIN 
ROE 1.00  
 
         
CG 0.06   1.00         
FSIZE 0.18  ** 0.34  *** 1.00       
LEVERAGE -0.16  * -0.11   -0.33  *** 1.00     
RETAIN 0.67  *** -0.07   0.27  *** -0.16  * 1.00   
ROE is the ratio of net income to shareholder equity. CG is the corporate governance score collected from The 
Globe and Mail. FSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
RETAIN is the ratio of retained earnings to total equity. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Table 4 presents the least square regression results. Based on a sample of high agency costs of FCF firms, the 
results show that better governed firms have better firm performance. The result is consistent with the 
traditional agency theory, and the findings of Rosenberg (2003) and Fallatah and Dickins (2012). Rosenberg 
(2003) reports that firms with effective corporate governance practices are associated with greater profits while 
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firms with poor governance bring less value to shareholders. Fallatah and Dickins (2012) also find that 
corporate governance is positively related to firm performance.  
Table 4 also shows that firms with higher retained earnings have better firm performance. The finding is 
consistent with the finding Khan et al. (2013). Khan et al. (2013) study the Pakistan textile industry and show 
that variations in retained earnings have an impact on firm performance, measured by stock returns. 
Table 4 Analysis of corporate governance and firm performance of high agency costs of FCF firms 
Intercept -14.116  
 
 
 (-1.138)  
 
 
CG 0.196  
 
* 
 
 (1.774)  
 
 
FSIZE -0.283  
 
 
 (-0.252)  
 
 
LEVERAGE -0.077  
 
 
 (-0.590)  
 
 
RETAIN 0.239  
 
*** 
 
 (10.202)  
 
 
INDUSTRY Yes  
Adjusted R
2
 0.479  
Total obs 133  
The dependent variable is ROE, defined as the ratio of net income to shareholder equity. CG is the corporate 
governance score collected from The Globe and Mail. FSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is 
the ratio of total debt to total assets. RETAIN is the ratio of retained earnings to total equity. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Conclusions 
"Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled" (World Bank Group, 
1992). Corporate governance deals with the relationships between managers, board of directors, controlling 
shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance is particularly important in 
the presence of free cash flow problems. The free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) suggests that when 
managers hold excessive cash flow, they are likely to waste the free cash flow on unprofitable projects or on 
organization inefficiencies.  
Agency theorists argue that corporate governance mechanisms can alleviate agency conflicts between 
shareholders and managers. Corporate governance can be implemented through mechanisms, such as 
shareholder ownership (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989), board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and 
executive compensation (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). In this study, we adopt a corporate governance index 
provided by The Globe and Mail (G&M) and examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance of firms with high agency costs of FCF. Given that previous research has not found conclusive 
evidence on the causality between good governance and good performance, this study aims to provide a 
more solid evidence by adopting a sample of firms that deem to have high agency problems. Specifically, this 
study examines a sample of high agency costs of FCF firms, defined as having high free cash flow and low 
investment opportunities. 
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The results of this study show that for firms with high agency problems, corporate governance is positively 
related to firm performance. That is, good corporate governance is effective in mitigating the agency costs of 
FCF problem and in safeguarding against mismanagement. Good corporate governance ensures that 
companies are accountable and transparent to investors. 
In conclusion, this study highlights the importance of corporate governance. The results will be of interests to 
the investment community, managers and regulatory agencies. An implication from this study is that investors 
should make their future investments in companies with good corporate governance. As the quality of 
corporate governance involves many soft factors (Pande, 2012), future research can conduct qualitative 
research to investigate how different factors affect corporate governance and determine the causality 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. 
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